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Abstract: 
At a time when political debate in the West is preoccupied with the 
perceived impact of extremist ideas on individuals who embrace or support 
terrorism, this article uses the publicly articulated grievances of Ayman al-
Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s most prolific ideologue, as a case study to examine 
how a globally focused and distributed extremist narrative matches political 
realities on the ground. The purpose of the article is to compare two 
political processes: the approach of Islamist extremists, as represented by 
Zawahiri, to constitutional reform as articulated through public appeals to 
potential supporters versus the reality of constitutional amendments and 
evolution of fundamental law in the Middle East and South Asia. 
Incorporating insights from studies on law and society and international 
relations, the article demonstrates how Zawahiri’s interpretation of 
religious law emphasises wholesale adoption of sharia whilst the process of 
legal reform has invariably resulted in the creation of legal hybrids, mixing 
Islamic and non-Islamic legal traditions. This is not an article about 
theology or religious law but an effort to dissect the public relations of an 
international terrorist movement. The analysis pays particular attention to 
events in Zawahiri’s native Egypt, where evolving grievances concerning a 
series of constitutional amendments—including those following the Arab 







Al-Qaeda’s grievances in context: reconciling sharia and society 
Abstract  
At a time when political debate in the West is preoccupied with the perceived impact 
of extremist ideas on individuals who embrace or support terrorism, this article uses 
the publicly articulated grievances of Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s most prolific 
ideologue, as a case study to examine how a globally focused and distributed 
extremist narrative matches political realities on the ground. The approach of the 
article is to compare two political processes: the approach of Islamist extremists, as 
represented by Zawahiri, to constitutional reform as articulated through public appeals 
to potential supporters versus the reality of constitutional amendments and evolution 
of fundamental law in the Middle East and South Asia. Incorporating insights from 
studies on law and society and international relations, the article demonstrates how 
Zawahiri’s interpretation of religious law emphasises wholesale adoption of sharia 
whilst the process of legal reform has invariably resulted in the creation of legal 
hybrids, mixing Islamic and non-Islamic legal traditions. This is not an article about 
theology or religious law but an effort to dissect the public relations of an 
international terrorist movement. The analysis pays particular attention to events in 
Zawahiri’s native Egypt, where evolving grievances concerning a series of 
constitutional amendments—including those following the Arab revolutions and the 
toppling of Mohammed Morsi—are assessed.  
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Major cataclysms of contemporary jihadism, such as the 9/11 attacks or the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Islamic State, IS) takeover of parts of Iraq and 
































































Syria in 2014, often provoke debates about the ‘essence’ of the jihadi mindset. What 
are they fighting for? What are they trying to achieve? Some argue ‘they’—the array 
of Islamist extremist militants captured by the catchall term ‘Salafi-jihadists’—hate 
the very essence of their adversary, whilst others point to tangible grievances such as 
Western hegemony and foreign policy. In reality, these two principal sources of 
grievance are intertwined: depictions of suffering and hardship are mixed with notions 
of illegitimacy of the current order and the need to replace it. One manifestation of 
this grievance narrative—and a major preoccupation of jihadi movements—is the 
focus on replacing colonial and positive law with religious law. This legal emphasis 
combines diagnosis and prognosis in the rhetoric of jihadi movements
1
 and is 
epitomised by transnational groupings such as ISIL that claim to have established and 
implemented (their interpretation of) Islamic governance in the territories they 
control.  
Yet this major preoccupation of Salafi-jihadi groups often focuses on 
territories and regions where legislators and society have been grappling with the role 
of Islam and sharia for generations.  
This article, in turn, compares two political processes: the ‘Salafi-jihadi’ 
approach to constitutional reform as articulated through public appeals to potential 
supporters versus the reality of constitutional amendments and evolution of 
fundamental law on the ground. My focus is on communiques delivered by Ayman al-
Zawahiri, Usama bin Ladin’s successor as leader of Al-Qaeda.  
I wish to compare Zawahiri’s public rhetoric against political realities 
whereby attempts to introduce sharia for multifaceted societies invariably result in the 
construction of legal hybrids. The focus of the article is on Zawahiri’s native Egypt, 
where the Al-Qaeda leader first became involved in politics in the late 1960s and in 
militancy in the 1980s.
2
 The objective is to highlight constitutional reform—and 
constitutional hybrids especially—as particular grievance that is central to Zawahiri’s 
public messages but something that is often overlooked in analyses of this discourse. 
The focus is less on Zawahiri himself, therefore, but rather onhis rhetorical output 
which can be seen as indicative of how a globally focused terrorist leader seeks to 
frame political events and reconcile these with existent master narratives.
3
  
































































I want to explore this content broadly, rather than focusing on the detailed 
evolution of particular narrative themes. In doing so, I incorporate insights from 
constitutional, socio-legal and political-historical studies as well as analyses of Al-
Qaeda and other jihadi movements. I begin by examining constitutional and socio-
legal issues as part of Al-Qaeda’s public narrative, introducing the concept of 
fundamental law in Al-Qaeda’s and Zawahiri’s discourse, setting out the context of 
this narrative: the evolution of legal-hybrids and role of sharia-based claims in Al-
Qaeda’s war of words with ISIL. I then trace the evolution of legal hybrids in Egypt 
and explain the substance of Zawahiri’s sharia-focused retort. I conclude by 
discussing the significance of contrasting the substance of these public relations 
initiatives against the evolving political landscape on the ground. Before setting out 
this argument, however, it is important to clarify the meaning of key concepts and 




What is sharia? 
Sharia has been described as ‘God’s eternal and immutable will for humanity’, which 
is binding for believers.  This will is expressed directly through the Quran and by 
Muhammad’s example (Sunnah), captured in accounts of the prophet’s conversations 
(hadith) and actions. Yet only a small proportion of Quranic verses specifically 
address questions of law (even though some are extensive).
4
 In the centuries after the 
formation of the first Islamic societies, therefore, professional scholar-jurists were 




The term sharia, therefore is often used to refer to ‘the entirety of legal 
disciplines as developed from within the Islamic tradition’, as Mallat notes,
6
 including 
decrees arrived at through human reasoning that would be seen as immutably fallible.
7
 
Since Sunni Islam lacks a clerical hierarchy, however, such human interpretations and 
applications of scripture can be readily refuted and challenged. For instance, Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, a surgeon by training, acknowledged in an online statement published in 
































































September 2015, ‘I love knowledge but I am by no means a scholar or an academic’.
8
 
Yet, as I explore below, he has frequently set out his own vision for implementing 
sharia through constitutional reform without elucidating in any detail how he defines 
the term or how he will extrapolate from scripture to judge and design contemporary 
society. Sharia, as this article unwraps, exists for Zawahiri as a rhetorical tool which 
is deployed as a sacred constant that is used to expose the illegitimacy of ‘the other’ 
and the inherent righteousness of his own political position.  
 
Al-Qaeda, the ‘Salafi-jihadi’ universe and beyond 
Public statements from the Al-Qaeda leaders have focused primarily on constitutional 
developments in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt—countries where significant 
measures have been put in place to respect and adhere to Islamic legal norms. The 
outcome of constitutional debates in these countries, moreover, invariably results in 
some form of compromise in the form of legal hybrids. Such hybrids undermine the 
very notion of religious purity upon which Salafi-jihadi movements are based and 
thus become part of their grievances as regards legal and constitutional matters in 
Muslim-majority countries.  
‘Salafi-jihadi’ entities, of course, do not constitute a homogenous monolith. 
They are a scattered, diverse and heterogeneous set of actors, united, as Wagemakers 
noted, in their belief ‘that jihad should not just be waged against invading or 
aggressive non-Muslim enemies but should also be used in a revolutionary way 
against the ‘apostate’ rulers in their own midst’.
9
 ‘Salafi-jihadism’, therefore, is a 
holistic reference that, as Hegghammer argued, tells us virtually nothing about who is 
considered the main enemy and how he should be fought: ‘the actors subsumed in this 
category do not share political preferences.’
10
 The ‘Salafi-jihadi’ umbrella term 
disguises many conflicting approaches to theology, implementation of scripture, 
conceptualisations of enmity, methodology and strategic prioritisation as I shall revisit 
below. 
Before the emergence of ISIL, Al-Qaeda reigned as the most prominent global 
jihadist entity and its agenda has been most prolifically posited by its second 
commander-in-chief, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri spent decades battling what he 
































































perceived as secular authoritarianism in his native Egypt before merging his flock 
with that of Usama bin Ladin to create ‘Qaedat Al-Jihad’ (‘the base of jihad’). Whilst 
his agenda became more international, however, Zawahiri never lost sight of his 
native Egypt and the process—in particular—of constitutional reform. Yet these 
ambitions clashed with the political realities on the ground in Egypt where Zawahiri’s 
voice has been just one of many articulating a preference for constitutional reform 
that reconciles the role of sharia.  
Zawahiri thus competes with other actors within his milieu, such as ISIL, as 
well as other alternative voices, vying for the attention of the same population. The 
political context—often underexplored in studies of ‘terrorist media’—is therefore 
central to and intertwined with my argument. Zawahiri’s rhetoric, and that of others 
like him, is ultimately supposed to relate to people’s daily lives and the realities they 
face in the communities in which they live. Developing two analytical threads that 
explore both the rhetoric and the reality on the ground is thus essential to understand 
this message in the political context for which it is designed. 
The thrust of Zawahiri’s focus since the dawn of the Arab uprisings in late 
2010 was on the turmoil in Egypt—from revolution to government by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and back to secular(ish) authoritarianism—to which he has sought to 
respond via public media initiatives. This article presents Zawahiri as a political actor 
who has—albeit remotely—been involved in these debates and who has a stake in 
their outcome. This study is also relevant in the context of the emergence of ISIL that 
has challenged Zawahiri’s version of Islamist-inspired militancy and transition in the 
region. 
Why is this perspective important? As well as defeating terrorist organisations, 
political attention in the West has increasingly turned to challenging the ideas that are 
seen to underpin them. Debates about ‘poisonous ideologies’
11
 and how to counter 
them have become prominent on the international political stage. The latter task, 
moreover, seems harder than the former: organisations can be undermined by 
targeting leaders or striking at headquarters and infrastructure. But ‘killing’ an idea is 
much more difficult. An understanding of how these beliefs and ideas are constructed, 
therefore, and in particular how they relate to the political realities that they are 
































































supposed to shape becomes increasingly important for both the practitioner and 
student of international relations.  
It is important to note, of course, that Zawahiri’s contribution to these beliefs 
and ideas is not scholarly sophisticated, nor is it intended to be. Zawahiri’s is a simple 
and often repetitive narrative that is supposed to appeal to the masses, rather than 
scholars or intellectual elites, who are usually seen as part of the problem. This 
narrative forms part of the Al-Qaeda leader’s public relations campaign and is often 
presented in media initiatives that incorporate styles adopted by the mainstream press, 
such as interviews and written opinion pieces. 
It is also important to note that the ‘true’ meaning of sharia and thus the 
essence of what constitutes a legitimate society differs according to perception and 
interpretation. No static meaning is universally adopted. Sharia in practice, as noted, 
is a system of law based on analogy and adaptation, not a defined body of edicts. As a 
result, allegations of improper or unrepresentative references to or applications of 
sharia flavour political debates and the rhetoric of extremist fringe actors. These 
actors seek to outbid rivals through claiming a greater degree of accuracy in their 
interpretation of scripture and thus a clearer sense of ‘purity’ in its application, 
analogous to the society over which the first four Caliphs of Islam presided, free of 
subsequent man-made modifications. Zawahiri, for example, compared the Egyptian 
Islamist An-Nour Party’s approach to sharia to that of the Saudi royal family: Islamic 
law was respected on the surface whilst the real ambition was to secure political 
power by currying favours from America and entrench a system of patronage and 
corruption.
12
 ISIL, meanwhile, has—as I shall discuss in more detail below—
presented Zawahiri’s approach to sharia as inherently misguided, to which the former 
has retorted with his own allegations of ISIL’s sharia infringement.  
 
Constitutional and socio-legal issues as part of the Al-Qaeda public narrative 
 
Between April 1994 and August 1995, Usama bin Ladin, then leader of Al-Qaeda, 
published fourteen open letters to the political leadership of Saudi Arabia, addressing 
the way in which politics and society had evolved under King Fahd. The central issue 
for bin Ladin was the extent to which he felt the Saudi regime had paid lip service to 
































































the implementation of religious law and juristic protocols in favour of Western-style 
‘laws of positivism’, which, he claimed, were in ‘opposition to the will of Allah.’
13
  
It may seem strange that bin Ladin became so preoccupied with what he saw 
as insufficient attention to sharia implementation in a country that has otherwise 
become known as relying extensively on direct references to sharia (albeit in 
uncodified form), especially as regards criminal law. For bin Ladin, however, the 
principal sin of the Saudi regime was that sharia and the spirit of sharia was 
implemented selectively. Reliance on religious law was thus not absolute, according 




Notions of religious purity and prevention of any form of ‘dilution’ of the faith 
in the way society is organised and legislated are presented as stark binaries in Al-
Qaeda’s rhetoric. Dichotomies pitching virtue against vice, true believers against 
disbelievers and hypocrites, or the true creed against westernised rationalism and 
materialism are central to Salafi-jihadi rhetoric.
15
 This ‘pure’ ideal-type, meanwhile, 
is contrasted against efforts to introduce sharia through legal reform in Muslim-
majority countries where the outcome has always been some form of legal hybrid. 
This outcome, in turn, feeds back into the Salafi-jihadi grievance narrative in an 
apparently perpetual grievance loop that is articulated to audiences and used to 
rationalise and promote violence. 
 
Constitutional hybridity and ‘dilution’ of sharia 
For years, state legislators in many Muslim-majority countries have sought to 
reconcile different positions regarding Islamic law by establishing what Fadel calls 
‘systems of legal hybridity’.
16
 Since independence in Egypt, for instance, legislators 
mixed pre-modern Islamic law with remnants of European colonial state law and 
positive law that sought to reconcile Islamic legal sensibilities with the modernist 
state project.
17
 With the demise of pan-Arabism in the 1970s, many looked to Islam 
for solutions to the many problems affecting the region. This Islamic revivalism, 
according to Lombardi, ‘profoundly affected constitutions in the Muslim world.’
18
 
































































This relates in particular to the introduction of what have been termed ‘Sharia 
Guarantee Clauses’ (SGCs) or ‘repugnancy clauses’
19
. Lombardi writes:  
SGCs try to realize through the lens of modern constitutionalism the classical Islamic 
political principle that a ruler’s laws should respect the fundamental principles of 
sharia. The SGC provides that, even if a law has been enacted according to 
constitutionally correct procedures, that law must be treated as void if it is 
inconsistent with sharia.20 
The exact meaning and impact of these SGCs, however, depends on their 
interpretation and fundamentals of institutional design. Here, compromise between 
diffuse political interests and dispositions—including Islamists and secularists—
becomes key. As Stilt observes:  
Once a constitution is promulgated, ‘new sets of interests and expectations form 
around the clauses and they enter a new phase, both attached to their historical 
development and available to take on—and be assigned—meanings by new 
individual and institutional actors within that country and beyond.21 
Some have pointed to the so-called ‘Turkish model’ as a potential template for 
compromise that can be adopted. This model of modern Turkey and the government 
of the Justice and Development Party (AK) has emerged, Choudhry argues, as ‘the 
central example of a state that has grappled with the relationship between political 
Islam, political competition, and constitutionalism in the Muslim world.’
22
 This spirit 
of compromise between Islamic and non-Islamic legal codes has a long tradition in 
Anatolia, where Ottoman expansion and consolidation of power was made easier by 
the Empire’s willingness to tolerate different religious creeds and socio-legal norms.
23
 
Yet such hybrids and compromises continue to constitute a major grievance for Al-
Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadis and herein lies a central contradiction in their rhetoric. 
The Al-Qaeda leadership has always been keen to celebrate the reach of 
Ottoman territorial expansion but ignores its legacy of compromise and reconciliation. 
The focus is on the re-establishment of the societal organisation apparently introduced 
by the Prophet Mohammed, his companions and their immediate successors as 
gauged primarily from hadith and biographies of the Prophet, but on a geographical 
scale that encompasses ‘every land that was once home for Islam’, seen from a 
contemporary perspective. This of course includes the Ottoman Empire at the height 
































































of its power and Muslim Al-Andalus.
24
 This central feature of the discourse, 
therefore, is a myth, an ideological construct upon which the fundamental idea of 
Muslim ‘reconquest’ is based.
25
  
The current ‘Turkish model’, in short, is seen as part of the problem. The AK 
government and Turkish army were ‘tools of the Crusade,’ Zawahiri noted in one of 
his statements, and the country had become secular, despite the AK’s Islamist 
credentials.
26
 As is often observed, the major problem is the introduction of Western-
style liberal democracy—presented as a form of idol worship—intertwined with 
concepts of the modern nation state and colonial-era drafting of state boundaries.  
This position has been embraced by other Islamists and impacted debates 
surrounding constitutional design. For example, during the formative years of 
Pakistan, the Jamaat-e-Islami organisation and its founder Mawlana Abul Ala 
Mawdudi objected to the incorporation of Western-style democratic principles into 
the constitution of the new Pakistani state. Pakistan had to become an Islamic state, 
Mawdudi insisted, and avoid legalising polytheism through adoption of pluralist 
legislative assemblies. Legislation, according to Mawdudi, ought to rest solely on the 
Quran and Sunnah, which would be interpreted and applied by an elected head of 
state who would be assisted by an advisory (shura) council. 
Mawdudi’s objections inspired other Islamist thinkers, in particular the 
Egyptian Sayyid Qutb whose life and works later inspired contemporary jihadists, 
including Zawahiri. Battle lines were drawn between those whose vision of Pakistan 
was for a homeland for India’s Muslims that would protect them against Hindu 
domination and advocates of an Islamic state government by sharia.
27
 Muhammad Al 
Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father, was strongly opposed to any notions of what he 
termed a ‘theocratic state ruled by priests with a divine mission.’
28
 Mawdudi, 
meanwhile, retorted: ‘if a secular and Godless instead of Islamic Constitution was to 
be introduced and if the British Criminal Procedure Code had to be enforced instead 
of the Islamic Sharia what was the sense in all this struggle for a separate Muslim 
Homeland?’
29
 These tensions have never been resolved in Pakistani society where 
repeated attempts at constitutional reform—from the Objectives Resolution of March 
1949 onwards—have resulted in awkward compromises between religious and ‘man-
made’ legal codes where, ultimately, legal pluralism prevails. 30  
































































Zawahiri has spoken and written extensively about fundamental law in the 
country that became the Al-Qaeda leadership’s adopted home after the collapse of 
Taliban rule in Afghanistan. In 2008, for instance, he published a four-part essay 
dedicated to the topic where he sought to dismiss notions that ‘the Constitution of 
Pakistan has been erected upon a sound Islamic foundation.’ Zawahiri offered an 
attractively simple argument: the root cause of the various problems that Pakistan was 
facing and the issues that many Pakistanis had complained about, such as 
subservience to the US and entrenched corruption, were due to the fact that Islamic 
principles were ignored and, for all practical purposes, absent from the Constitution. 
Notably, the thrust of Zawahiri’s critique revolved around dissecting SGCs in the 
Pakistani Constitution and references to the role of Islam, focusing on the Preamble 
and Articles 2, 2A, 31, 38, 203 (A-J) pertaining to the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) 
and Part IX (Islamic Provisions). All these clauses, according to Zawahiri, were 
‘incapable of bringing about the establishment of the Sharī`ah, both in theory and in 
practice’.
31
 The Constitution, he complained, legalised fasiq, disobedience to the 
sharia, which in itself constituted an act of infidelity, kufr. For example, the 
President, who could be a woman according to the Constitution (Article 41), was 
given authority to pardon any crime (Article 45), regardless of severity and mandatory 
sharia punishment that might apply, whilst politicians could not themselves be 
charged with breaching sharia (Articles 48, 66, 248).
32
 The implication of Zawahiri’s 
thesis of course was that the Pakistani state was illegitimate and could thus be justly 
targeted in acts of violence since its architects of fundamental law ‘had received 
training within the English culture and were in awe of their civilization.’
33
 
Yet more attempts at societal construction in the Muslim world have presented 
new and unexpected ideological challenges to Zawahiri’s preferred interpretation of 
doctrine.  
 
Sharia references and a jihadi war of words  
The emergence of ISIL—which in contrast to Zawahiri began to implement its 
interpretation of scripture on the ground after consolidating territory—has forced the 
latter to formulate a public relations response, which defines Al-Qaeda’s model of 
jihad as more sustainable and legitimate. The ensuing war of words between ISIL and 
































































Zawahiri, which centres on accusations and counteraccusations of sharia 
infringement, helps us to position the latter in this regard within a broader milieu of 
jihadi actors with a stake in politics and society in the Middle East and beyond.  
  Zawahiri has charged ISIL of breaking the code of fealty not only to the Al-
Qaeda leadership but ultimately to the Afghan ‘Islamic Emirate’ led by the Taliban. 
Zawahiri accuses ISIL of being excessive in its violence and unjust in its sectarian 
targeting, as well as undermining the greater struggle against America and its allies. 
ISIL’s violence is presented as being counterproductive and extra-legal, particularly 
as regards Muslim victims of violence, and the result of arrogant leadership that risks 
fomenting turmoil in the region.
34
 
 ISIL representatives, in turn, have retorted by challenging Zawahiri’s 
leadership, focusing in particular on his apparent dereliction of sharia. ISIL has made 
explicit references to sharia in its public relations output to justify its violence against 
Sinjar Yazidis and enslavement of those who survived and highlighted examples of 
huduud—sharia punishment—in cities it has controlled for ‘offences’ such as sodomy 
and consumption of pornography.
35
  
With respect to Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda, ISIL spokespersons have presented 
the former’s apparently ‘relaxed’ approach towards sectarianism, and the Shia laity 
especially, as a form of sharia violation that undermines the sanctity of the followers 
of the true creed. The fifth and sixth editions of ISIL’s English language Dabiq 
magazine for example referred to Zawahiri’s 2008 media initiative called the ‘Open 
Meeting’ where the Al-Qaeda leader responded to questions issued via online forums. 
Here, Zawahiri used the opportunity to clarify his stance towards Shia who were, he 
argued, ‘excused due to their ignorance’ and could thus not be condemned en masse. 
Their ‘guilt’, he argued, would depend on particular action such as collaborating with 
American occupiers.
36
 This stance, argues ISIL, amounts to sharia violation since 
takfir—excommunication—is limited to particular individuals and behaviours, not the 
essence of apostasy, which is the position that ISIL representatives embrace.
37
  
In another issue of Dabiq, an ISIL loyalist recounted experiences from his 
time with Al-Qaeda in Waziristan where he claims non-Islamic ‘tribal laws’ prevailed 
over sharia, accusing the ‘pacifist’ Zawahiri of neglecting to carry out appropriate 
































































sharia punishment in the interest of retaining tribal alliances.
38
 Zawahiri, ISIL alleges, 
has thus ‘abandoned the pure heritage’ left by Usama bin Ladin.
39
   
Zawahiri, in turn, has sought to undermine ISIL with his own references to 
sharia, presented in similarly static terms, in his public relations efforts. He accused 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIL who declared himself Caliph in June 2014, 
of contravening the example set by the prophet as described in hadith—an extremely 
serious accusation—especially the principles of consultation and proportionality and 
of rejecting arbitration of ‘independent’ sharia courts, proposed to resolve tensions 
between rival jihadist groups in Syria. ‘Whoever was testified against by the 
established religious scholars that he escapes from being called to be arbitrated with 
Shariah’, Zawahiri warned, ‘is not on the method of Prophet-hood; he is not even 
suitable for an allegiance to be pledged to him.’
40
 
If, for simplicity’s sake, contemporary Salafi-jihadi praxis is divided into 
political-military pragmatism and ideological puritanism
41
, the rise of ISIL and its 
spat with the Al-Qaeda leadership clearly places Zawahiri, in practical terms, in the 
former camp in terms of the methods to achieve desired results. Whilst he has been 
condemned by former jihadis in Egypt for his excesses, Zawahiri comes across as a 
‘middle-of-the-road’ jihadi next to, for example, ISIL and its followers.  
Yet whilst he has shown—and been condemned for—flexibility as regards 
sectarian issues and aspects of doctrine, Zawahiri has dedicated his career to 
articulating a particular position in terms of societal construction based on the 
implementation of his vison of sharia and constitutional reform. This component of 
Zawahiri’s rhetoric is often overlooked or reduced to commonly observed depictions 
of democracy as an idolatrous, false and alien system. Yet, as the examples from 
Pakistan above serve to illustrate, Zawahiri has sought to participate in debates about 
constitutional reform and social-legal issues in great detail which demonstrates the 
essence of his grievance that goes far beyond a simple protest against foreign 
interference. Zawahiri’s preoccupation with constitutions and the laws that govern 
society, meanwhile, unveils a core weakness of his argument: whenever sharia 
implementation has been tabled as a form of constitutional reform the inevitable 
conclusion has been legal hybridity, a form of compromise which, in turn, becomes 
central to Zawahiri’s problem diagnosis. Furthermore, and given the number of actors 
































































involved—including Islamists of all stripes—this outcome cannot be blamed on a 
single set of forces such as ‘America’ or ‘colonialism’ that constitute such prominent 
sound bites in Zawahiri’s rhetoric. Nowhere is this dilemma more acute than in 
Zawahiri’s native Egypt.  
 
The evolution of legal hybrids in Egypt 
 
In spring 1947, Hassan al-Banna, the founder and first General Guide of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood published an open letter to the Egyptian and Arab political 
elites. In his letter titled ‘Toward the Light’, al-Banna expressed his desire to ‘guide 
the nation’ towards ‘the way of Islam and its principles, its rules, its culture and its 
civilization’ rather than ‘the way of the West and the outward aspects of its life, its 
organization and its methods.’ For al-Banna the suffering and devastation brought by 
the Second World War illustrated the failure of the West, its political systems, 
leaders, conferences and ‘strange ideologies.’ Islam, in turn, provided hope. Al-Banna 
wrote: ‘there is no regime in this world which can supply the forthcoming nation with 
what it requires in the way of institutions, principles, objectives, and judgments to the 
same extent as Islam can’. Al-Banna emphasised amending Egyptian law ‘such that it 
conforms to all branches of Islamic legislation.’ In terms of administrative matters, al-
Banna suggested that graduates from the ancient mosque-seminary Al-Azhar in Cairo 
would be elevated to senior positions in the military and state bureaucracy. Societal 
reform would also reflect the envisaged shift to legislation based on the Quran and 
Sunnah exclusively. Alcohol, gambling, dancing and prostitution would thus be 
prohibited, schools would be segregated according to gender and the state would 
enforce a strict form of censorship, limiting access to films and music to productions 
that would be deemed palatable according to Islamic norms and values.
42
 
Al-Banna’s vision, of course, was never realised.  Rather, subsequent attempts 
to draft and re-draft fundamental law in Egypt would refer to some elements that were 
contained within al-Banna’s roadmap as part of a compromise ‘hybrid’ that was far 
removed from the General Guide’s desire for a unified, cohesive and ‘pure’ ‘Islamic 
nation.’
43
 Although Zawahiri and other ultra-conservative Salafi-jihadis condemned 
































































the Brotherhood for its apparent leniency and willingness to embrace democracy, they 
too emphasised the need for a unified state governed by Islamic principles solely 
rather than ‘hybrids’ that incorporated different legal traditions that thus diluted 
applied religious doctrine. This hybrid, however, has persisted in Egypt and 
epitomised the different forces, identities and objectives that need to be reconciled.  
A year after al-Banna published his letter, the first major attempt to re-
Islamise aspects of the post-independence Egyptian legal system saw the Napoleonic 
Code replaced with a Civil Code drafted by Abd El-Razzak al-Sanhuri. Al-Sanhuri 
was an advocate of adapting sharia to the needs of the modern state and this was 
reflected in his Code.
44
 In this sense, as Fadel notes, ‘Pre-Modern Islamic Law would 
have to be transformed into a body of rules consistent with the standards of 
contemporary legal science.’ Sanhuri’s Civil Code, therefore, would ‘grant a 
modernised Pre-Modern Islamic Law a central place in Egypt’s legal system.’
45
 In 
seeking to reconcile Islamic law with the modern state, however, al-Sanhuri would, 
again, arrive at a hybridity that would fail to satisfy Islamist purists. As Fadel argues: 
Al-Sanhūrī’s proposal to create Islamic State Law, even if it was substantively 
Islamic, appeared to reinforce the notion that the law was an artefact of sovereign will 
rather than the product of the religious and discursive practices that constituted Pre-
Modern Islamic Law, and to that extent it could still be impeached as not being truly 
“Islamic.” Indeed, one might say in criticism of al-Sanhūrī’s vision of an Islamic 
State Law that there is an inherent tension between the positivist legal culture of the 
emergent civil law system in Egypt (and by extension, to other Arab states), and the 




This tension has arguably persisted within Egypt and spurred on the militant Islamist 
fringe. Whilst the Free Officers’ coup in 1952 popularised anti-Western sentiments, 
consensus relating to role of Islam in law and society remained elusive. Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s notions of nationalism and pan-Arabism in particular were condemned by 
Islamists and have consistently been derided by Al-Qaeda and other militant Islamist 
groups. In 1964, two years before he was executed by the Nasser regime, Sayyid 
Qutb, published an essay titled Ma'alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones on the Way). Here he 
famously proclaimed that Egypt was again in a state of jahiliyyah, a form of religious 
ignorance that prevailed before the revelation of the Quran. This approach and 
































































terminology has remained prominent in the discourse of Islamist militants ever since. 
Qutb complained that the ‘whole environment, people’s beliefs and ideas, habits and 
art, rules and laws is Jahiliyyah.’
47
 It was necessary, Qutb argued, to ‘revive that 
Muslim community which is buried under the debris of the man-made traditions of 
several generations, and which is crushed under the weight of those false laws and 
customs which are not even remotely related to the Islamic teachings, and which, in 
spite of all this, calls itself the “world of Islam.” 
48
 Law and society in Egypt had to be 
based entirely on the concept of tawheed, that there was only one god and authority, 
from which all institutions and legal structures ought to be derived. Sharia was 
universal law, the edict that governed all aspects of human life. Like other Islamists 
ideologues, Qutb presented his argument as a strict dichotomy:  
Islam knows only two kinds of societies, the Islamic and the jahili. The Islamic 
society is that which follows Islam in belief and ways of worship, in law and 
organization, in morals and manners. The jahili society is that which does not follow 
Islam and in which neither the Islamic belief and concepts, nor Islamic values or 




As with al-Banna, the reality of Egypt’s muddled legal hybrids was, of course, far 
removed from Qutb’s ideal type.  
This was particularly evident in Nasser’s secular, authoritarian and nationalist 
Egypt. By the 1970’s, however, the Egyptian government under Anwar Sadat found 
itself in a crisis of legitimacy.
50
 The regime had failed to attract investment and faced 
a stagnant economy and a growing Islamist resurgence.
51
 In order to shore up support 
from the liberal opposition and increase confidence in the economy, the Sadat regime 
resolved to draft a new constitution. The most important decision was to establish a 
new Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) as an independent entity to oversee 
constitutional review.
52
 In an effort to placate conservative Islamists in Egypt, this 
constitution was later amended to reference sharia as the chief source of legislation.
53
 
Article 2 thus stipulated: ‘Islam is the Religion of the State. Arabic is its official 
language, and the principal source of legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence (Sharia).’
54
 
As Lombardi notes, although Article 2 ‘was not without its ambiguities, most 
understood it to be an SGC.’
55
 Tasked with interpreting this clause, the SCC dealt 
with several significant Islamist challenges to Egyptian law, which were sometimes 
































































rejected and sometimes upheld. The Court, Lombardi argues, ‘used a method that was 
heavily indebted to liberal modernism, but that also made some gestures towards 
more conservative methods of interpretation.’ 
56
 The very interpretation of Article 2, 
therefore, appeared to conform to the spirit of the Constitution itself that incorporated 
conservative Islamic and modern liberal sources of identity.  
Hassan al-Banna wrote in his aforementioned letter from 1947, ‘The most 
dangerous period in the life of a nation, and the most deserving of critical study, is the 
period of transition from one situation to another. It is then that plans for the new 
period are laid and its guiding principles and policies are drawn up, according to 
which, the nation will be formed and to which it will adhere.’ Although describing the 
process of decolonisation in Egypt, his words seem equally apt for the turmoil of the 
2011 revolution and its aftermath.  
After winning the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood government quickly 
became embroiled in bitter disputes with other factions of society and, especially, the 
judiciary over fundamentals of the post-authoritarian Egyptian state. Despite 
opposition, Mohammed Morsi and his government pressed on with the drafting of a 
new constitution, which was eventually approved in December 2012. The process, 
however, had been hugely controversial, particularly as regards the role of sharia in 
the Egyptian legal system.
57
 While Article 2 was retained, new additions were 
designed to strengthen the position of Islamic law in Egyptian society. Article 4 
elevated the role of Al-Azhar and called for its Committee of Senior Scholars to be 
consulted on matters concerning Islamic law. A new clause, Article 219 was added in 
order to codify a particular Islamist interpretation of Article 2. This Article decreed 
that ‘[t]he “principles of Islamic law” include its universal textual proofs, its rules of 
theoretical and practical jurisprudence, and its material sources as understood by the 
legal schools constituting Sunni Islam.’
58
 Article 219 was in essence the culmination 
of protracted wrangling over the wording of Article 2 and was intended to define ‘the 
principles of sharia principles.’
59
  
Article 219 thus offered further (if ambiguous) assurances relating to the 
Islamic foundations of Egypt’s constitution. The combination of Articles 4 and 219, 
moreover, caused some to be concerned that Sunni legal doctrine was being 
incorporated wholesale into the system of positive laws with further interpretive 
































































powers granted to the Al-Azhar.
60
 The impact of these amendments as they stood in 
the 2012 Constitution, of course, was never realised since the process was interrupted 
by the July 2013 coup. Nevertheless, even with the added emphasis on sharia and 
Sunni legal tradition in the 2012 Constitution, the hybrid nature of the Egyptian legal 
system was retained. As Fadel argues:  
Whatever else one might say about the 2012 Constitution, it accurately reflects 
the hybrid nature of Egypt’s political and legal regime over the last 150 years: 
continuity with Islamic legal and religious traditions, while at the same time 
embracing as national goals modernization in the fields of the organization of 
the state, economic development, and a qualified acceptance of the post-World 
War II regime of international human rights law.
61
 
Even when Islamists finally did reach positions of political power in Egypt, therefore, 
the outcome of resulting reforms and constitutional amendments retained the spirit of 
legal hybridity, even if the balance shifted towards Islamic legal norms. It is the 
nature of awkward compromises, of course, that many groups are left frustrated and 
disillusioned. Some facets of the Islamist community and the Brotherhood wanted 
stronger references to sharia and a break from the tradition of SCC’s novel, and often 
liberal, legal interpretations. Some Salafis clashed with other Islamists over juristic 
interpretations and the weight of traditional legal norms and scripture. A small faction 
within this Salafi milieu, moreover, has resorted to acts of violence that are justified 
with reference to the apparent need to ‘recreate’ the soc o-legal realities that prevailed 
during first three generations of Muslims. These elements, which had always warned 
against the apparent fallacy of democracy, were reinvigorated in Abdel Fattah el-
Sisi’s Egypt in light of efforts to ban Islamist political groupings. Among the many 
voices vying for attention during these tumultuous events, moreover, Zawahiri has 
sought to speak to his supporters and potential sympathisers by offering a detailed 
dissection of constitutional issues in Egypt as part of his public relations initiative. 
These references form a prominent and distinct part of his public engagements that 
yet have largely been overlooked in the analytical literature.  
 
Zawahiri and constitutional reform in Egypt  

































































Despite embracing transnational jihad via Al-Qaeda, Zawahiri has always remained 
preoccupied with his native Egypt and occasionally issued lengthy statements and 
publications complaining about developments in Egypt, including the state of socio-
legal and constitutional matters. There was something fundamentally wrong, Zawahiri 
argued, with a constitution that gave legislative power to a People’s Assembly
62
—the 
foundations of positive law—rather than implementing God’s law via a religiously 
sanctioned process of consultation (shura). ‘Either we govern according to God’s 
revelation,’ Zawahiri argued, ‘making our actions agree with our words (“there is no 
God but Allah”), or we govern in spite of God’s revelation, which means associating 
other gods with God, because sovereignty is God’s alone.’
63
  
Constitutional issues have thus been at the heart of Zawahiri’s ‘grievance’ 
narrative and a core component of his activist stance. In 1999, for instance, Zawahiri 
published an article on a Mohammed al-Maqdisi’s ‘Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad’ 
website titled ‘Muslim Egypt b tween the Whips of the Torturers and the 
Administration of Traitors.’ Here, Zawahiri identified four main categories where he 
felt the Egyptian regime had committed ‘crimes’ against Islam. The first concerned 
constitutional matters. A constitution that prevented uptake of the sharia and 
representing Western—primarily British—legal norms had not only been established, 
but also become deeply embedded in the Egyptian system. The other problem areas 
that Zawahiri identified: foreign affairs, domestic issues and educational matters, all 
stemmed from the fact that secularists ruled Egypt.
64
 As with bin Ladin’s Saudi-
focused ‘open letters’ referred to above, therefore, the fundamental problem was an 
inherently illegitimate man-made legal structure, which—in turn—spread corruption 
and weakness in other spheres of society.  
During the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions, Zawahiri released a statement where 
these sentiments were reiterated. He argued: ‘The Egyptian Government, as stated in 
its principle documents, is a nationalistic, secular, democratic government,’ ruling by 
‘hukum al-jahiliyyah’, judgments based on religious ignorance. He presented stark 
alternatives between the old order that was being toppled with the revolution and his 
vision of what ought to take its place. First, the old Egyptian government had been 
secular, whereas an Islamic government would abide by the heavenly creed. Second, 
































































although authoritarian in practice, the old regime had claimed to be democratic and 
adopted a democratic constitution, which respected the wishes of the masses 
regardless of the Islamic moral code. An Islamic government, in turn, would rely on 
shura, consultation, which would refer to the sharia whilst keeping the rulers 
accountable. Third, despite written references to popular participation, the Egyptian 
government had in reality been a suppressive and brutal regime that rigged elections 
and suppressed opposition. An Islamic government, according to Zawahiri, would, via 
shura, rely on spreading justice and confronting oppression, enjoining good and 
forbidding evil. Fourth, the old regime had relied on nationalistic sentiments and 
sources of identity and old colonial conceptions of state boundaries and practices, 
whereas the envisaged Islamic government would be based on principles of Muslim 
equality and unity under the auspices of a Caliphate.
65
  
The statement, and others like it, was not intended as a detailed roadmap. 
Zawahiri, as noted, is a physician, not an Islamic scholar, and the references to the 
desired way forward have always been vague in Al-Qaeda’s rhetoric. They serve the 
purpose of inspiring and legitimising violent activism, rather than providing details of 
suggested alternatives. This justificatory narrative, however, has frequently focused 
on problems of existing societies and sought to refute measures that might undermine 
Al-Qaeda’s vision. In this regard, Islamist alternatives that are still far removed from 
Al-Qaeda’s extremist rhetoric pose particular challenges as they appeal to some of the 
same support base (i.e. mobilised Islamists) and offer more realistic and less radical 
and selective interpretations of religious doctrine.  
In this sense, undermining the credibility of those who might offer alternative 
interpretations of religious doctrine is particularly important. In the case of Egypt, the 
role of Al-Azhar was especially prominent. As early as 1995, bin Ladin cautioned 
against some the shaykhs of Al-Azhar. They had agreed to shore up the legitimacy of 
the Nasser regime, despite its rejection of Islamic principles in favour of nationalism 
and socialism, he argued.
66
   
Much later, during the height of the Arab Spring revolutions, Zawahiri issued 
several statements warning against ‘elements’ of Al-Azhar, even as the Muslim 
Brotherhood was exploring ways in which to elevate the position of the mosque-
seminary in the new Constitution. Al-Azhar had turned into a ‘government agency’ 
































































under the Mubarak regime, Zawahiri argued, and thus suffered from a legitimacy 
deficit. Its ability to operate freely had been undermined by the fact that Al-Azhar’s 
senior leadership depended on the government’s seal of approval. This was 
particularly the case, Zawahiri argued, with Muhammad Sayyid Tantawy, who served 
as Grand Imam of Al-Azhar from 1996 to 2010.
67
  Al-Azhar, according to Zawahiri, 
had to be able to select its own leadership regardless of outside influence
68
 if it was to 
avoid turning into ‘trumpets of the government.’
69
 Even within the confines of Al-
Azhar itself, however, Zawahiri warned that the institution had a ‘bright side’ and a 
‘dark side’. The former, according to the Al-Qaeda leader, represented the ‘lions of 
Al-Azhar,’ jihadis such as Abdullah Azzam—bin Ladin’s mentor and one of the 
leaders of the Arab jihadists fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan—and Omar Abdur 
Rehman—leader of the Egyptian terrorist group Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya.
70
  The ‘dark 
side’, in turn, consisted of the lackeys; scholars and religious figures who were 
prepared to support ‘secular’ governments. Examples included Tantawy and several 
senior Afghan religious figures who opposed the Taliban.
71
 
What about existing guarantees to safeguard and implement Islamic legal 
codes in Egypt? Zawahiri, in particular, has always been dismissive of the apparent 
utility of SGCs in the Egyptian constitution and the feasibility of introducing sharia 
under existing law. Article 2, Zawahiri complained, offered only vague assurances of 
respecting the ‘principles’ of sharia, without excluding man-made laws.
72
 As a result, 
any references to Islamic law were cosmetic, he argued, and designed to placate 
opponents of Western legal traditions. Indeed, other clauses besides Article 2, 
rendered these references void. For example, references to the role of the President of 
the Republic (such as Article 134) prohibited non-Egyptian Muslims from being 
elected president but did not stipulate that the candidate must be ‘a Muslim, male or 
legitimately capable, and this is clear and absolute contradiction with the Islamic 
sharia,’ Zawahiri insisted. Christians, Jews and even atheists could thus rise to 
become Head of State in Egypt or be appointed to the judiciary, whilst Sudanese, 
Libyan or Palestinian Muslims could not even participate in the elections, since they 
lived outside the borders drafted by the secret 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement between 
the French and British. This fundamental error had been retained in the 2012 version 
of the text, according to the Al-Qaeda leader. The Egyptian Constitution, according to 




































































In a mock ‘interview’ with Al-Qaeda’s media arm As-Sahab published in 
April 2014, Zawahiri spoke in great detail about the constitutional issues that he felt 
continued to plague Egypt. Here he elaborated his objections concerning Article 2. 
The Article, Zawahiri argued, contained two major contradictions that 
rendered the clause useless and, by extension, efforts to introduce or adhere to sharia 
in Egypt void. First, it prevented actual application of (Zawahiri’s interpretation of) 
sharia because it spoke only of sharia principles, not the wholesale enacting of sharia 
and would thus allow for decisions to be legal even though they contravened Islamic 
law. The defunct Article 219—of which Nour Party founder Yasser Brhami had been 
so proud—changed nothing, Zawahiri argued. Second, Article 2 only referred to 
sharia as the main source for legislation, but—as Zawahiri noted—‘being the main 




Furthermore, Zawahiri protested that the SCC had ‘made rulings which clash 
violently and clearly with Islam’—including a ruling from 1993 which argued that 
Article 2 did not apply retrospectively, thus greatly undermining the apparent 
adherence to sharia principles since laws that preceded it would still be enforceable 
even though they contravened Islamic law.  The SCC, moreover, took its legitimacy 
from the wishes of the majority, not sharia, and could therefore technically repeal 
Article 2 completely and put the decision to a referendum, elevating ‘people power’ 
over God’s law and sovereignty. Article 2 and its references to sharia, therefore did 
not ‘govern’ society but could in turn be controlled.  
Numerous articles of the 2014 Constitution also contradicted it and sharia, 
according to Zawahiri. Article 11, for example, stipulated men and women should be 
equal, Article 93 obliged the state to respect treaties and conventions on human rights 
and Articles 65 and 67 guaranteed freedom of thought and opinion without restriction, 
irrespective of whether these were in violation of sharia, as Zawahiri saw it. 
































































Article 2, therefore, was fundamentally flawed in Zawahiri’s view since it 
failed to protect against sharia violations elsewhere in the Constitution and in 
Egyptian society.   
Amid the turmoil of the Arab Spring and its aftermath, and following the 2013 
coup, Zawahiri issued several statements suggesting fundamental changes to the 
Egyptian Constitution that would remedy the flaws that he had identified. Article 2 
had to be amended, he insisted, to ensure that all legislation stemmed from sharia 
law.
75
 In fact, the first act of amending the Constitution ought to be replacing the text 
of Article 2 with the clause: ‘Islamic sharia is the sole source of legislation, and all 
the articles of the constitution and the law which opposed it are null and void.’
76
 All 
caveats and ambiguities would thus be removed. Similar efforts had to be put in place 
to restructure the judiciary in order to respect and implement religious law.  
With the military coup of July 2013 and subsequent efforts of the Abdel Fattah 
el-Sisi’s government to subdue the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt has entered a new 
political period. As part of this process, a new Constitution replaced the Brotherhood-
sponsored 2012 version after a referendum in January 2014. In the new version, 
Article 219 was removed, as were provisions regarding the consultative role of Al-
Azhar and religious political parties were banned. The 2014 Constitution, moreover, 
made gender equality more explicit, as noted. Although none of the Islamist 
provisions of the 2012 Constitution would have satisfied the extremist militant fringe, 
therefore, the new Egyptian Constitution has reinforced Salafi-jihadi notions of the 
futility of compromise and conventional political participation.
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Within this discourse, and for Zawahiri in particular, the focus and substance 
of the criticism has been on ‘hybrid’ legal systems that combine Islamic and non-
Islamic sources and on references to ‘partial’ recognition of Islamic law that is 
‘diluted’ both on paper through the drafting of written constitutions with references to 




































































Many Muslim-majority societies have grappled with the introduction of Islamic 
norms in their fundamental laws. For many, divergent identities and the need for 
compromise produce legal hybrids that mix references to Islamic law with positive 
law and remnants of colonial law. For Zawahiri and other Salafi jihadists such hybrids 
represent a fundamental sin. Religious doctrine, which cannot by definition be divided 
or diluted, is implemented selectively or sometimes only rhetorically. This is not only 
a major grievance for Zawahiri but also one that combines animosity towards tangible 
victimisation, such as the legacy of colonialism, with more normative and value-based 
assumptions of how society ought to be organised. Whilst the ‘extremist ideas’ 
espoused by terrorist leaders may be repetitive and simplistic, therefore, they can also 
be more multifaceted than an initial cursory glance at such discourse might suggest. 
Zawahiri is by no means unique in weaving multiple threads together into a grievance 
narrative that spans different layers of social, normative and political perspectives.   
For Zawahiri, dilution of sharia is seen as a direct causal factor for other more 
immediately tangible grievances, such as the practice of usury, unhindered freedom of 
expression, nationalism, secularism, pluralism and subservience to the West. This is a 
holistic narrative intended for global audiences. At the same time, however, the 
preoccupation with constitutional reform makes it much harder to attach blame in a 
consistent or clear manner, given the number of different actors involved in these 
processes. Indeed, the preoccupation with constitutional reform, as set out in 
Zawahiri’s discourse, highlights the tension between his rhetoric and the reality on the 
ground. But this tension can only be understood and documented when the substance 
of these public relations initiatives are compared and contrasted against the evolving 
political landscape in Egypt, Pakistan and other regions that formed the thrust of 
Zawahiri’s argument. 
 Part of Zawahiri’s narrative, therefore, can best be described as a form of 
radical Islamist populism where constitutional and socio-legal grievances form a 
perpetual loop. Simple and impracticable answers are offered to complex socio-legal 
challenges that can only be realistically and lastingly resolved via a process of 
compromise. The results of such compromises, in turn, are fed into the grievance 
narrative again in order to justify and promote platforms that rationalise violence 
against societies that are presented as being inherently illegitimate. Compromise and 
negotiation, therefore, is not only seen as a weakness in its own right but also a source 
































































of grievance, because it dilutes non-negotiable religious precepts, thus corrupting and 
undermining the fundamental belief system.  These grievances, in turn, serve to 
legitimise yet more confrontation with those who seek compromise.  
  These grievances over the dilution of religion and its application in practice 
through compromise with secular regimes form part of the wider Salafi-jihadi milieu. 
This milieu is diverse, and reflects the heterogeneity of the organisations that form it. 
But a common theme that transcends organisational or ideational boundaries is a 
determination to reach out to and mobilise perceived constituents, to secure their 
support and sympathy. The challenge, in the construction and delivery of these 
communicative efforts, is to ensure that the substance of the message conforms to the 
reality faced by the message’s intended audience. It must resonate in order to be 
effective.
78
 Whilst much of this message, for organisations like ISIL and Al-Qaeda, 
focuses on the day-to-day suffering or the aspirations of people, another thread 
inevitably concerns more long-term perspectives on societal organisation and political 
alternatives to the status quo. It is with these latter concerns, as this article has 
explored, that cracks emerge in the narrative endeavour of bridging political rhetoric 
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